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ABSTRACT
This report describes the results of investigations conducted by the Materiel Testing and
Research Subsection, Technical and Operations Services Department of the General Electric
Company. This investigation is concerned with the hazards potential evaluation of Plastic
Bonded Starter Mix (PBSM) production process and its ultimate use in MI8 and M7A3 grenades.
The investigation indicated:
• Those materials which exhibit the greatest hazard characteristics.
• The process operating stations most likely to introduce initiation stimuli or hazardous
conditions.
• The test program necessary to examine ignition characteristics and process hazards.
• The method to handle the accumulated information from testing and system safety
analysis.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
1.1 GENERAL
The past few years have seen a rapid increase in the sophistication of weapons and weapons
systems relative to manufacture, transportation and storage. At the same time, the bulk and
variety of the munitions have greatly increased, concurrent with rising costs of production
facilities, causing a disproportionate increase in the costs of handling and storage of special
types of ammunition. It is appropriate, therefore, that the criteria used for the determination
of "safety distance" and other safety controls be utilized as one of the basis for examination
of. the recent weapon effectiveness and optimization studies.
While experience has proven the validity of these criteria, they must be re-evaluated from time
to time in accordance with current "state-<:>f-the-art" developments in the field of weaponry and
techniques in order to assure that the maximum standards of safety, consistent with economic
considerations, are being attained.
Requirements as outlined in DOD Instruction 4145.23 dated March 1966, "Quantity Distance
Standards for the Manufacturing, Handling and Storage of Mass Detonating Explosives and
Ammunition, " have been under continual revision. As a result of a number of test programs
conducted by a number of governmental and industry groups, these revisions now represent the
best that can be done in developing the appropriate hazard criteria, on the basis of existing
at-hand information. Despite these efforts, a number of problems remain unsolved, and the
costs incurred in meeting criteria which may be overly conservative in specific cases of
special application may well run into millions of dollars without assuring a finite degree of
protection.
Additionally, it is felt that the demands of the rapidly changing technology are such that safety
criteria must be developed in terms of a measurable degree of hazard, since the concept of
absolute safety is no longer attainable, if it ever existed.
The basic philosophy governing the tasks accomplished is that maximum benefit in the determin-
ation of hazards in specific terms was obtained by a thorough evaluation of past tests, accidents,
and basic research into similar munitions. It was necessary, therefore, as discussed further
herein, to make maximum utilization of the considerable amount of valid information which has
been accrued in the form of investigations, special studies and tests, and of similar information
available as a result of other experiments and studies conducted by other governmental and
industrial activities.
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Major emphasis was placed on the information and methodology contained in the Pyrotechnic
Hazards Evaluation and Classification Program conducted for Edgewood Arsenal, particularly
in those functions of that program dealing with the environment about the munition. Such infor-
mation properly used provides valid scaling points. Other significant spin-off benefits resulted
from the coincidence of the program.
Since quantitative information appropriate to the "Safety" problem may differ by an order of
magnitude from that information generated for the pyrotechnic starter mix problem, it follows
that variables in the Plastic Bonded Sta.rter Mix (PBSM) situation may assume significant
importance in determing the factors of safety required for acceptable safety criteria. For this
reason, all factors governing pyrotechnic starter mixes were carefully re-examined.
1. 2 BACKGROUND
The proposed introduction of a plastic bonded starter ~ix disk into the manufacturing process
for M-18 color smoke and M7A3 cis grenades generated the requirement to undertake an
investigation into the potential hazards of PBSM during the process of its manufacturing,
transportation, and storage.
Limitations introduced by the rapid turnaround from concept to production applications. utiliz-
ing the PBSM disk, necessitated an abbreviated examination of the potential hazards and the
development of a comprehensive test plan to be applied later. Finally. the need for a mathe-
matical simulation of the planned tests to enable assessment of the potential hazards completed
the initial requirements for examination into the PBSM.
L 3 RECORDS AND EXPERIENCE ANALYSIS
This section contains the findings, recommendations. and conclusions of a search of the various
records and technical documents containing significant data and information relative to pyro-
technic hazards classification and evaluation used for the research into the properties and
hazards of various plasticized compositions.
The objectives of this segment were to:
a. Review the findings relative to the characteristics of pyrotechnics and starter mix-
tures as established by tests and the literature search and also to identify and attempt
to resolve any anomalous findings or to determine the course of further studies and/
or tests.
b. Contact all available sources for the accumulation of records of accident/incident
experiences in pyrotechnic and related industries, and to analyze this data with
particular reference to:
• Causes - procedures, human error. training, skills, equipment, or facilities.
1-2
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• Type of initiation stimuli - static, friction, dust, impact, heat, shear, pinching,
etc.
• Source of stimuli - machinery, air, or human
• Propagation, communication, and transition reactions
• Type and degree of damage - fire, blast, and fragmentation
• Identification of major damaging factor(s)
• Probability, in gross terms, of various types of accidents
• Correlation of damage data with "quality distance" criteria specified in AMR
385-224
c. Direct particular attention toward little known reactions, imcompatibilities, contam-
inants, evidence of synergism, and effects .of geometric configurations during the
review, and to analyze pyrotechnic incidents.
d. Use the results of this analysis as the basis for the formulation of the test program.
Approximately 310 related technical handbooks, reports, manuals, references, and other
documents were reviewed for applicability to the immediate program and also to the potential
program. Appendix A of this report contains a bibliographical listing of the documents reviewed
and classifications for each based on these two criteria.
The documents researched were obtained from the following primary sources:
• Defense Documentation Center
• General Electric Technical Information Retrieval System
• Bureau of Mines Technical Reports
• Bureau of Explosives Reports
• Chemical Propulsion Information Agency Reports
• Picatinny Arsenal Publications
• Army Materiel Command Safety Office Reports (including Edgewood Arsenal and
Pine Bluff Arsenal Reports)
• Ballistics Research Laboratory Reports
• NASA Scientific and Technical Information Facility, College Park, Maryland
• Department of the Army Publications
• Department of the Navy Publications
• Department of Defense Publications
1-3
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The documents searched were selected from sources cited previously and present a very wide
spectrum of the field. Much of the literature consists of reports and technical papers on the
pyrotechnic and high explosive industries. However, it was found that a large percentage of the
literature does not contain sufficient technical detail. The results and conclusions reported in
some of the technical literature indicate that the industry may need more exact test methods,
test equipment, and instrumentation. In addition, a systems approach to the overall problem
of hazards evaluation is lacking. Much of the literature is redundant and is concerned with
obsolete methods and procedures.
The value of a literature search such as this is difficult to ascertain in specific terms. The
obvious advantage to performing a literature search is that it provides a technical and scientific
basis upon which to plan and conduct a program and avoids possible costly duplication of effort.
1,4 MATERIAL HAZARD ANALYSIS
1,4.1 INTRODUCTION
Quantitative chemical analysis of the raw materials, bUlk compounds, and the final plastic
bonded starter mix for concentrations of likely contaminants and compounds that could poten-
tially increase the sensitivity of the product to initiation by those stimuli found during production
processes was deemed impractical during this initial examination of the PBSM although highly
desirable to be undertaken in a follow-on program. In lieu of the chemical analysis, examina-
tion into the chemical constituents of the PBSM and their properties was undertaken for familiar-
ization purposes and development of a comprehensive test program.
The essential ingredients comprising the PBSM are as follows:
Approximate Proportion
by Weight
• Potassium Chlorate
• Sodium Bicarbonate
• Acra Wax C - filler
• Santicizer 141 - plasticizer
• NC 1845 polymercaptan - crosslinker
• XD2679 resin
39
9
3
5
20
20
Preparation of the ingredients and the final mix is undertaken wherein all the solids are pre-
sifted, mixed and then slowly added to the blended liquid materials.
1-4
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1.4.2 PREPARATION
An appropriate weight of resin material is added directly into a vertical planetary mixing
bowl. The plasticizer is then added to the material and mixed slowly to avoid splashing and
loss of the plasticizer. Mixing is continued until homogeneous and recycled as necessary to
assure total blending of all the resin.
Dry potassium chlorate is screened through a 60-mesh screen and placed in a double cone
blender along with screened sodium bicarbonate and Acra Wax C that has been screened
respectively through 60.mesh and 30-mesh screens. The blended materials are stored in.a
Velostat bag and sealed until use.
Liquid preblend is combined with the crosslinker in a planetary blender. A well ventilated area
is mandatory because of the extremely pungent and objectionable odor. The proper quantity of
solid preblend is slowly added and blended. The mix .is then poured (as soon as possible) into
polyethylene M18 or M7A3 starter mixture molds which hold approximately 15 grams. The
pot life of the material is approximately three hours after addition of the crosslinker (NCI845).
Batches of PBSM prepared as above approximate 30 pounds of material.
The poured mix is cured in an oven at 700 C for two hours. When cured, the material is not
extremely hard, but will have a rubber-like consistency and can be touched without sticking.
L 4. 3 HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
Examination of the process for production of the PBSM as outlined above provides some insight
into those periods when the process inherently is more hazardous than other periods and which
would identify potential test methods to explore the hazards and initiation sensitivities to be
proposed in the test program.
Individually, the constituents of the PBSM each offer some degree of hazards. Identification
of those which could be determined during the records and experience analysis are discussed
below. Others for which no immediate information is available would be researched more
thoroughly in a follow-on program.
1.4.3.1 Potassium Chlorate
Potassium chlorate is composed of transparent, colorless crystals that decompose at approxi-
mately 4000 C with the liberation of oxygen. Differential thermal analysis (DTA) shows the
decomposition point to be 362.20 C ~ depending on the factors that influence DTA. When KCI03
is mixed in stoichiometric amounts with sulfur, DTA shows that decomposition occurs at
179.10 C ~.
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During the thermal decomposition of KCI03, products are formed through the following
intermediates:
•
•
2KCI03
KCl2 =
= KCI02 + KCI04
KCI + 02
• KCI04 = KCI + 202
The crystal lattice structure of KCI03 is of tremendous importance in determining what actually
causes increases sensitivity. If the cxystal lattice structure can be loosened by different
solvents. catalysts, and by recrystallization from water. decomposition will occur at a lower
temperature. CuO. NiO. and Mn02 are recognized as good catalysts and lower decomposition
temperature considerably.
1.4.3.2 NC1S45 Polymercaptan
The exact formula for this material is not known; however, comparison to normal mercaptan
substances should indicate that this material exhibits the following hazardous characteristics:
• Toxic hazard rating from moderate to high and could produce unconsciousness in
high concentrations with cyanois, cold extremities and rapid pulse.
• When heated to decomposition, mercaptans are dangerous and emit highly toxic fumes
of oxides of sulfur.
Regarding the polymercaptan as a sulfur, the process combination with potassium chlorate
creates the highly reactive starter mix (PBSM).
Sulfur itself is known to exist in two stable crystalline forms and at least two amorphous and
two liquid forms. One crystalline form is ordinary (rhombic, octahedral. alpha, SS) sulfur
that is stable at room temperature but undergoes transition to the Beta form at 94.50 C with
a melting point of 112.So C. The other crystalline form is Beta-sulfur (monoclinic. prismatic)
which slowly changes to the Alpha-sulfur form below 94.50 C but has a melting point of 119.30 C.
Once sulfur approaches the liquid form in the 100-1100 C range. volume changes become very
pronounced. This volume change could cause considerable crystal lattice loosening of the
KCI03 -polymercaptan mixture, thereby increasing reactivity of the mixture.
Not much research has been performed on the effect of contaminants on the decomposition of
potassium chlorate-sulfur mixes with the exception of the work of Tanner, who found that a
stream of sulfur dioxide flowing into a KCI03-S mix ignited it immediately.
It should be pointed out that KCI03-S mixes are very sensitive to H2S04. It has been found
that a drop of H2S04 on 0.5 gram of a KCI03-S mix caused an explosion because of both chloric
acid (HCI03) and heating effects. It was also determined that 802 has produced an explosion
with KCI03-S at 100
0 C.
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It has been proposed a reaction mechanism where polythionic acid is the "trigger" to start
the reaction with the exothermic reaction mass. Four reactions were proposed:
•
•
•
H2Sn0 6 = H2S04 + 802 +
802 + 2KC103 =' 2CI02
2CI02 + 4S = 2802 + S2Cl2
(N-2)S - Reaction (1)
+ K2S04 - Reaction (2)
- Reaction (3)
• Expressing Reactions (2) and (3) as one reaction,
S02 = 2KCI03 + 3S = 2802 + S2Cl2 + K2S04 - Reaction (4)
Chain Reaction
Reaction (1) is significant in that air oxidation produces sulfurous acid on the surface of the
sulfur. This acid, however, reacts quiddy with sulfur to form polythionic acids (H2Sn0 6).
Reaction (1) is also significant in that a sudden rise in temperature will produce additional
sulfur dioxide and sulfuric acid. Sulfuric acid, because it is hygroscopic, favors additional
production of polythionic acids. As long as the temperature continues to rise, reaction (1)
is not reverSible, but a drop in temperature causes a reverse reaction. Sulfuric acid tends
to coat the surface of chlorate as it is produced resulting in formation of chloric acid.
Reaction (4) is a chain reaction which produces more sulfur dioxide than is consumed.
Sulfur changes from a solid form to the liquid form, and finally, to gas. Sulfur will decom-
pose in the presence of oxygen as long as sufficient heat exists to sustain the decomposition.
Reactions are as follows:
• S + 02 = S02
• 2S + 302 = 2S03
803 reacts with H20 to form sulfuric acid.
2S03 + 2H20 = 2H2S04
From this, it is recognized that considerable care must be taken during the process to reduce
the potential of exposure of the potassium chlorate and polymercaptan to undersirable environ-
ments which could increase the sensitivity of the compounds.
1. 4. 3. 3 Santicizer (R) 141 Plasticizer
Santicizer (R) 141 plastidzer, a compound of alkyl aryl phosphate manufactured by the
Monsanto Chemical Company, "combines into one compound the non-flammability, the efficien-
cy, and permanence of other vinyl plasticizers." Its low temperature flexibility, moisture
and resistance, and electrical properties appear to make it an excellent compound for use in
the PBSM product. It has also received Federal Drug Administration approval as a non-toxic
plasticizer for food packaging.
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Its characteristics imply that in its use with the other constituents in the PBSM, a relatively
stable compound would result.
Since this material replaces Alorcol 1500 Plasticizer which has according to the manufacturer's
technical information sheet a "high dielectric strength and resistivity, " the electrostatic igni-
tion hazard potential should be thoroughly studied.
1. 4. 3. 4 Role of Moisture
The actual role that water vapor plays in pyrotechnic reactions is very complex and not well
understood. It has been postulated that water molecules, in their escape from the reaction
zone, are likely to cause fissures and erosion effects on the KCI03 crystal which facilitate
diffusion. In addition, water catalyzes the formation of polythionic acids.
One might predict, then, that the presence of water in ~e system would increase the sensitivity.
However, it was discovered in the pyrotechnic hazards program that ingredients of pyrotechnics
stored at 60 percent relative humidity before mixing were desensitized relative to dry mixes.
1.4.3.5 Sodium Bicarbonate
This compound is the desensitizing agent utilized to control the reaction mechanism of the
potassium chlorate and polymercaptan. Its contribution to the final plastic bonded starter mix
is such that no identifiable hazard is exhibited by the sodium bicarbonate by itself.
It must be postulated that the other ingredients added to the composition have decreased the
sensitivity of the KCI03-S mixture. The sodium bicarbonate tends to coat the crystals of the
KCI03 and makes them insensitive to any reaction that could cause a rise in temperature. It
must be assumed that if a rise in temperature occurs, the ions or atoms in any crystal will
become excited and increase in such amplitude about their position in the lattice that diffusion
is encouraged and the particles can exchange positions. This results in a phase shift, and when
solid substances undergo a transformation of this type, atoms are in a "loosened" state.
1.4.4 SYSTEM SAFETY ENGINEERING QUANTITATIVE HAZARD ANALYSIS
Behind nearly all accidents is a cause that can be identified and eliminated. Inherent in the
role of safety analysis is the responsibility for properly identifying and eliminating accident
causes before they occur.
There are various qualitative and quantitative techniques which are used in analyzing data
acquired from hazard analysis, safety tests, safety reviews, and accident reports. Based on
a review of safety analysis procedures, one or more techniques may be used with equal success.
The necessary criterion for depth and adequacy of the technique employed is traceability; i. e. ,
cause to effect or effect to cause.
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Safety analysis techniques which are tailor-made to tie in with research testing programs have
been developed as a practical approach for evaluating processing hazards. The techniques are
based essentially on accident investigations and emphasize both the quantitative and qualitative
assessment of process conditions in standard engineering terms and establishment of material
response to stimuli found in the process.
As spelled out in the Air Force System Command Design Handbook on Safety, the System Safety
Engineering Hazard Analysis and Matrix is a standardized systems safety analysis (which
basically encompasses a failure mode and effect analysis) and is oriented toward a nine-step
method that can be adopted to a variety of situations. The results can therefore be written in
a nine-column matrix with accompanying diagrams. As shown in Figure 1-1, the nine-step
approach utilized during a theoretical program includes:
• Prepare system block or functional flow diagrams representing the basic conceptual
breakdown of the process, job operation, sequence of events, or physical movement
of material.
• Determine the number of accidents in which each individual component was involved
and compare to the overall processing operation.
• Determine all envisioned malfunctions, failure or error modes for each component,
step, or functional interface.
• Determine the chain of events that might follow an error or malfunction so that
likely secondary failures or difficulties are identified.
• Determine the resultant effects or consequences to the system and identify all
personnel hazards in terms of blast, fragmentation, and fire.
• Determine the corrective action and list all recommendations, such as design changes
and procedural changes.
A sample application of System Safety Engineering Quantitative Hazard Analysis is shown in
Appendix B.
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SECTION 2
TEST PLAN DEVELOPMENT
2. 1 TECHNICAL APPROACH
Diagraming the process operation, as previously outlined, and combining this information with
known hazards associated with normal starter mix compounds, a cross reference from opera-
tion to test can be postulated and utilized in the development of the potential test program to
examine the actual production hazards, transportation safety requirements and storage condi-
tions applicable to the PBSM. Testing of normal starter mixes was carried out in the Phase I
Hazards Evaluation and Classification Program and is reflected in Appendix C.
2.2 PLANNING
The entire planning phase is predicated on the logical diagraming of the information available
and must, by necessity, be extended to include the overall project plan which comprises all
segments of the work undertaken or to be undertaken. Therefore, attention is drawn to Figure
2-1 which presents a step by step approach to the solving of the basic objectives of the PBSM
project.
The objectives of the test plan developed for the conduct of the PBSM Program are as follows:
a. To develop cost effective, reproducible simulations of those incidents/accidents
determined by the foregoing studies, analysis, etc. , to be major hazards to the
manufacture of PBSM pyrotechnics ~
b. To establish "worst case" conditions in terms of the potential seve rity of the incidents
concerned.
c. To provide a logical rationale to permit conversion with related tests and studies in
in the field.
d. To identify areas where "follow-on" tests (beyond the scope of the current program)
are necessary to present, insofar as is practicable, a standard test geometry to
permit the reduction of replicate tests to the minimum required for cost/effective
solutions.
e. To identify those factors, initiating stimuli, degree of confinement, etc., which are
controlling or overriding in a given situation.
It has been determined that in any given accident/incident a number of initiating stimuli may be
available and that those stimuli may occur under various environmental conditions of material
confinement, geometry, or consolidation. The philosophy used herein has been to consider the
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worst caSe condition in order to obtain a rough order of magnitude approximation of potential
severity, with the intuitive feeling that the "worst case" or "maximum credible" incident
determination will prove to be amenable to control or preventive actions of a comparable magni-
tude with those controls applical:>le to reactions of lesser severity. In the event that this proves
not to be the case, i. e., if the preventive or control criteria necessary for the maximum
credible incident is not "cost effective" in terms of the "maximum probable" incident, additional
tests will be conducted to the less restrictive criteria.
As an example, for this reason the method of initiation (stimuli) chosen has been the initiation
of materials by a J -2 cap, which provides a shock wave, and a shaped charge effect with suffi-
cient energy release to detonate high explosives. Similarly, the degree of confinement, geome-
try, and combinations of materials have been related, on the basis of preceding tests, as those
which will result in the highest level of reaction.
Examination of the process operation for the PBSM as 'diagramed in Figure 2-2 shows the follow-
ing primary areas of hazard:
• Blending of liquids and solids
• PBSM disc molding and container recycle
• Drying and associated off-gassing
• Mold recycle
• Transportation and storage
The test program developed as a result of the system analysis activity is presented in Figure 2-3
and is durther discussed in the following paragraphs.
2.3 TESTING ACTIVITY
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION
This section presents the testing program to determine whether specific plastic bonded starter
mixes compositions are safe to handle, transport, or store. The proposed testing program
will determine the reaction to specific initiating influences.
The following discussion deals with the various tests to be performed on laboratory samples of
bulk compositions and mixes. These sample compositions, and/or sufficient raw material to
blend or mix the compositions, will be provided by the Edgewood Arsenal.
2.3.2 LABORATORY CHEMICAL ANALYSIS
Quantitative chemical analysis of the raw materials, bulk compounds, dyes, and starter mixes
for the concentrations of contaminants in the form of metals will be carried out utiliZing atomic
absorption spectrophotometric analys is.
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The theory and practical application of atomic absorption spectrophotometric analysis is well
known. Basically, the principle of this method is the aspiration of a solution containing the
sample into a flame, resulting in a large proportion of the metal atoms becoming ground-
state or neutral atoms. Actual passage of a resonant beam of monochromatic light through
such a flame will result in reduction of its intensity by absorption of a portion of the light by
the neutral or ground-state atoms.
Because the absorption is proportional to the concentration of neutral atoms in the flame,
measurement of the absorption can be used as a quantitative determination of the concentration
of the metallic element in the original solution. Measurement of the absorption of radiation in
the ground-state or neutral atoms of the atomized sample occurs at a wave-length that is
specified and characteristic of the element under consideration.
Because the measurement made is a reduction of an initially greater intensity, it is called a
spectrophotometric measurement. Concentration of the neutral atoms in the flame can be
varied by many methods, including burner gas flow and the chemistry of the sample itself.
Standard solutions containing several concentrations of metallic elements are used as standard
reference material for the spectrophotometric determination. Atomic absorption spectrophoto-
metric determinations are unquestionable applicable to materials with concentrations of various
metallic elements present in minute quantities.
The analytical program for atomic absorption spectrophotometric analysis is designed to pro-
vide metallic concentration of iron, manganese, copper, chromium, nickel, and cobalt on the
following:
• Raw materials
• Starter mixes
As indicated, further testing will consist of certain special tests designed to assess the physical
and chemical characteristics of the sample material through the following tests.
2.3.3 DIFFERENTIAL THERMAL ANALYSIS
Differential Thermal Analysis will be used to determine physical and chemical reactions that
might occur when the material is subjected to a rise in temperature. Fischer Series 200 Differ-
ential Thermal Analyzer or equivalent will be used.
DTA measurements are used extensively to detect any exothermic or endothermic changes that
might occur in a chemical system by measuring the temperature difference between a sample
and a thermally inert reference material as both are heated at a constant rate of increase of
temperature. A reference material will be selected which did not undergo any thermal reaction
over the temperature range under investigation, so that any exothermic or endothermic change
occurring within the sample will cause its temperature to either exceed (exothermic) or lag
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(endothermic) behind that of the reference material during the course of a physical or chemical
reaction. All physical or chemical reactions that occur during a differential thermal analysis
are related to the mass of the sample, size of sample, heating rate of the sample, and particle
size of the sample. These chemical or physical reactions represent changes that may be related
to decomposition, dehydration, crystalline transition, melting, boiling, vaporation, polymeri-
zation, oxidation, and reduction of the mate rial unde l' investigation.
2.3.4 PARR BOMB - HEAT OF COMBUSTION
Test samples of the selected materials will be burned in an oxygen filled metal "bomb" sub-
merged in a measured quantity of water. By observing the rise in water temperature resulting
from combustion of the sample, a calculation of the number of heat units (calories) liberated
will be performed. Standard test methods will be used with ASTM procedure D240-64 "Heat of
Combustion of Liquid Hydrocarbon Fuels by Bomb Calorimeter" the prime reference.
2.3.5 DETONATION TEST
Segment 2 of the proposed testing program consists of the testing of bulk materials in accordance
with TB 700-2 as modified to enable acquisition of the maximum physical/chemical characteris-
tics. Specific details concerning individual elements of TB 700-2 are presented in subsequent
paragraphs. Tests found to provide the maximum information should be performed prior to
others of lesser importance with the intent of reducing the overall testing requirements.
A series of tests will be performed to measure the sensitivity of a pyrotechnic sample to the
influence of a No.8 blasting cap. A two-inch cube sample will be placed on top of a perpen-
dicular, 1-1/2 inch (diameter) by 4-inch (long) lead cylinder. The No. 8 blasting cap will be
placed perpendicular to and in contact with the top surface of the sample. A 2-inch wood
cylinder with a hole drilled through its center will be used to position and support the blasting
cap. The cap will be initiated by a suitable electrical surrent. Detonation of the sample will
be evidenced by the deformation (mushrooming) of the lead cylinder. This test will be con-
ducted a minimum of five times, or until detonation is evidenced, whichever is less. Test
configuration is shown in Figure 2-4.
2.3.6 IGNITION AND UNCONFINED BURNING TEST
Unconfined samples of pyrotechnics will be ignited and burned in order to evaluate the resul-
tant hazards associated with such burning. These tests will be conducted on single and
multiple (four) 2-inch cube samples. For Test No.1 (single sample test), a 2-inch cube
sample will be placed on a bed of kerosene soaked sawdust and the sawdust ignited with an
electrically initiated matchhead igniter. This test will be conducted a minimum of two times.
In Test No. 2 (multiple sample) four 2-inch cube samples will be arranged with end-to-end
contact, on a single bed of kerosene soaked sawdust and the sawdust ignited with a matchhead
igniter. This test will be conducted a minimum of one time. The Ignition and Unconfined
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Burning Test Report will include ignition~etlagration-detonationand burning time data of
samples as applicable. Modifications to acquire burn temperatures should be investigated.
Test configuration is shown in Figures 2-5 and 2-6.
2.3.7 THERMAL STABILITY TEST
Material samples will be subjected to elevated temperatures to allow the observance of charac-
teristic tendencies to detonate, ignite, decompose or change in configuration. The sample will
be placed in an explosion-proof oveD, the temperature raised to 750 C (1670 F) and maintained
at this temperature for a period of 48 hours. Oven temperatures will be continuously recorded
throughout the test period. Test configuration is shown in Figure 2-7.
2.3.8 IMPACT SENSITIVITY TEST
A.series of tests (20) will be performed to determine the sensitivity of a pyrotechnic sample
to mechanical shock (impact). These tests will use the Bureau of Explosives impact test
apparatus. A 10-mg sample will be placed in the test cup, the test weight dropped from a
predetermined height, striking the sample, and thus itnparting the required shock (impact).
Modifications to this technique in the form of instrumentation to measure drop weight accelera-
tion, input energy and sensitivity to initiation are suggested. Results of the measurements will
enable calculation of dwell time, velocity and time to reaction.
The results of the 20 tests per sample (10 at 3-3/4-inch drop height and 10 at 10-inch drop
height) will be reported as the number of trials exhibiting:
• Explosion, flame and noise
• Decomposition, smoke, no noise
• No reaction, no smoke, no noise
Test configuration is shown in Figure 2-8.
2.3.9 FIELD SENSITIVITY TESTING
2.3.9.1 High Explosive (HE) Equivalency Tests
Samples of the PBSM materials will be initiated with an appropriate electro-explosive device.
These tests will determine the materials' tendency to transmit from deflagration to detonation
and will be instrumented to measure overpressure and impulse at selected distances from the
test position. The worst case conditions (total confinement) to which the material could be
subjected will be tested during this sequence.
2.3.9.2 Granular Bulk
In this test, the sample will be of a weight and material to simulate the blend existing at the
initial mixing phase of the production process. The sample will be subjected to the influence
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of a suitable ignition source. Blast overpressure gages (used for measuring side-on overpres-
sure) will record the complete pressure time history of the shock wave (if detonation occurs)
so that peak pressure and impulse data will be obtained. Calibration runs will be conducted
with TNT, C-4 or pentolite of the same measured weight as the sample being tested, and a
minimum of three tests will be conducted on each material to assure the validity of data.
2.3.9.3 Preblend Compositions
The samples used in this test will be of such weight and blend and be of such a state, liquid or
solid, as to simulate the configuration existing after the consolidation of materials in the second
phase of the production process. The sample will be subjected to the influence of a suitable
ignition source. Blast overpressure gages (used for measuring side-on overpressure) will
record the complete pressure time history of the shock wave (if detonation occurs) so that peak
pressure and impulse data will be obtained.
Calibration runs will be conducted with TNT, C-4 or pentolite of the same measured weight as
the sample being tested and a minimum of three tests will be conducted on each material to
assure the validity of data.
2.3.9.4 Starter Mix Consolidation
If appropriate, the samples used in this test will be processed to simulate the configuration
existing at the final stage of the production process. The sample will be subjected to the
influence of a suitable ignition source. Blast overpressure gages (used for measuring the side-
on overpressure) will record the complete pressure time history of the shock wave (if detonation
occurs) so that peak pressure and impulse data will be obtained. Calibration runs will be made
with TNT of the same measured (weight) amount as the sample being tested, and a minimum of
three tests will be conducted on each material to assure the validity of data.
2.3.10 MIXER SIMULATION TESTS AND RESUL TS
As discussed in "systems safety analysis ", the mixing operation involving vertical planetary
mixers to prepare PBSM formulations has been identified as a primary hazard area. The
safety analysis further pointed out that failure modes such as misalignment, impact, or inade-
quate grounding of the mixer blades and/or mixer bowl are likely to cause ignition by friction
within the bulk of the materials. When ignition is induced below the surface, the material
supplies a significant pressure head which allows a transient pressure buildup caused by the
temporary confinement of reaction by-products.
Previous testing demonstrated that the pressure-time curve of a confined material closely
resembles that of a detonating explosive. Thus, a potentially hazardous situation exists during
the mixing operation because of the possibility of simultaneous ignition and confinement in a
localized region near the bottom of the mixing bowl.
2-14
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Self confinement simulation tests were designed to provide data to evaluate a potentially hazard-
ous situation. In line with the concept of "worst case" testing, the location and type of ignition
Source in all cases are chosen to maximize the likelihood of inducing a detonation (according to
guidelines established by previ<.>us experimental results) while maintaining a credible simulation
of an actual mixing operation.
The objectives of this test program are to determine the following criteria:
• Bulk mix and mixing bowl influence on the reaction rate.
• Extent of the pressure buildup.
• Probability of communication to loose mix inadvertently scattered in the vicinity of
the mixing operation.
• Scaling laws to predict the outcome of an actual incident.
To accomplish these objectives, a single self-confinement simulation test series is to be
performed.
A typical self-confinement test and the results are shown in Appendix D.
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SECTION 3
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1 SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS
3.1.1 GENERAL OBSERVATION AND SIGNIFICA~T FINDINGS
The process flow, the ingredients involved and the test program as outlined were oriented to-
ward examination of the hazardous characteristics of the plastic bonded starter mix under
different degrees of confinement. stimuli and environment.
The following paragraphs are intended only to relay significant observations by operation sequence
and not to correlate to any particular material being processed.
3.1.1.1 Liquid Preblend Preparation
Caution should be taken to avoid accidental loss of material during this process since a change
in the weights of material could cause a considerable change in the effectiveness of the PBSM.
A variance at this point could effect the ignition, burn rate, and heat output of the PBSM.
3.1. 1.2 Solid Preblend Preparation
Mesh size and maximum drying of the solid materials are the two areas in this stage of the
process requiring close observation. From information researched, there is some question
regarding the proper mesh screen to be used in preparation of the potassium chlorate. One
source sites a 325-mesh screen and the other a 60-mesh screen. Since particle size has an
effect on the output and, therefore, the hazard p:>tential of the final product, this disagreement
should be examined further.
The effect of moisture has been previously discussed; however, its effect in the PBSM should be
examined further.
3. 1. 1. 3 Final Blending
The presence of objectional vapor could affect the operator judgement and technique. and the
need for extreme caution at this time is deemed mandatory. The mixing time requirements
and the odor could cause excessive haste and result in an undesirable accident. The liquid
constituents are normally non-flammable while flammability of the off-gassing vapors is unknown,
but would be researched in a follow-on program. On the basis of such studies, the presence of
a vapor detector and warning system should the vapors exceed desirable limits would be advis-
able.
From the information presently available, the quantity of material being handled is in the neigh-
borhood of 30 pounds,and this could effectively reduce the p:>tential incident severity.
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3. 1.2 TEST PROGRAM
The test program outlined in Section 2 is oriented towards examination of those stimuli readily
recognizable as being present during the manufacturing, transportation, and storage processes.
There are many other applicable tests and chemical/physical characteristics analyses which
could be performed concurrent with the proposed tests. A few of the basic critical parameters
are contained in Appendix E.
3.1.3 DATA EVALUATION AND SIMULATION
The process of system safety analysis, test data evaluation, and hazard identification are
readily applied to a simulation technique whereby the physical/chemical characteristic can be
matrixed to the test result and hazard identification to form a predictive model of all the param-
e~ers. By this application, significant differences in levels of risk between processes can be
assessed and the maximum theoretical, maximwn credible, and maximum probable incidents
involving the PBSM can be prepared and then compared with other similar materials. The
application of this technique is by nature dependent on'the performance of a test program as
outlined and would be appropriate for the follow-on program.
3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the scope of this study, it is recommended that the test program as outlined be imple-
mented and such modifications made to the test methods as to allow for maximum acquisition of
physical/chemical characteristics of the PBSM under the particular test environment.
It is also recommended that an in-depth review of the production process as finalized be under-
taken with the intent of isolating those potential hazardous areas beyond the scope of those
identified in this study. An actual plant survey with specific interest in determining those areas
where potential hazards exist as single incident, dual incident or multiple incident situations
and whether the situations anticipated could cause communication from detlagration to a detona-
tion reaction in the PBSM would be advisable.
3-2
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APPENDIX B
SAFETY ANALYSI S - METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTS
B. 1 RESULTS OF OPE RATIONAL SURVEY
It has been concluded from Operational Survey, based on the degree of hazards associated with
pyrotechnic materials, the findings from the Operational Survey, the plant tour, and the system
analysis efforts, that the primary hazard areas, as listed according to order of importance,
are:
• Pressing and consolidation of pyrotechnic mixtures in the grenade and
canister body.
• Reaming of the filled-and-pressed grenade ~r canister to remove excess
pyrotechnic mix.
• Blending and mixing of pyrotechnic smokes and starter mixes.
• Filling/screening operation of grenade and canisters.
Results of the Phase II, Segment 2 Operational Survey based on Pine Bluff Arsenal accident re-
ports for the period from January 1, 1968, to December 31, 1969, are given in Table B-1, Acci-
dent/Incident Analysis. As noted in the table, pressing has the largest failure rate (40 percent),
followed by reaming (27 percent), then filling (13 percent), and finally blending/mixing (10 per-
cent).
Table B-1. Accident/Incident Analysis
Station
Blending/
Process Mixing Filling Pressing Reaming Miscellaneous Total
M18 Grenades
- -
2
- -
~
155mm Canisters 1
-
9 11
-
21
Other Canisters
- -
5 2 1 8
XM675 Cartridges
- - - -
1 1
XM176 Launchers
- - - -
1 1
M126 Bomblets 2 6 4
-
1 13
Starter Mix 2
- - - - 2
Total 5 6 20 13 4 48
(10'k ) (13'l) (40'1) (27tI) (10'k) (100'l)
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Tables B-2 through B-5 present the System Safety Engineering Quantitative Hazard Analysis.
This systematic approach was taken to identify all possible failure modes and actual test re-
quirements for four critical processes:
• Pressing
• Reaming
• Blending/Mixing
• Filling
The technique of analysis used to compile the Quantitative Hazard Analysis Matrix was based
in particular on the description of the "corrective actions" given in the Pine Bluff Accident
Report. Examining the accident description of the report revealed that in most of the accidents
the ignition source was concealed or not in direct view of the operator. This leads to the con-
clusion that the inherent shortcoming of any type of systems safety analysis is that the" correc-
tive actions" (ultimately the failure modes) are a judgement of what the operator or safety
engineer on the scene of the accident believes to have caused an accident.
Finally, for many of the individual accidents, two corrective actions were employed to prevent
recurrence of an accident. For example, the corrective action after a small fire on the green
smoke press line was to check the press and die for proper alignment and reinstruct employees
to clean the die/mold thoroughly. Consequently, for this accident there were two possible modes
of failure: Misalignment, and improper procedure during cleaning (resulting in mix still remain-
ing in die). Accidents with possible multiple corrective actions were seldom correlatable. Con-
sequently, for ease of interpretation, they were classified as having unknown failure modes. ~
Therefore, the failure modes were assigned based on the corrective actions listed in the accident
report, and the validity of these results is limited by the accuracy of the accident reports. In
addition, for the sake of completeness, all future possible failure modes are given in the matrix.
Referring to the Quantitative Hazard Analysis Matrix, the number of accidents per failure mode
is given merely to assign a value of the relative importance of a particular failure mode.
B.2 CONCLUSIONS
Tables B-2 through B-5 present a fairly comprehensive program for identifying process conditions
under which ignition can occur. In order to cover the results of these findings and indicate their
relevancy to specific process ignition mechanisms, a fault tree analysis (Figures B-1 through
B-4) is presented for each of the processes which have been identified as a critical area.
Working across from left to right, a net is constructed of all events which contribute to the
hazardous condition. The OR - gate represents a situation where one or more events will
result in the occurrence of the resultant condition. The AND - gate represents a situation in
which the occurrence of all input events must take place simultaneously before the output event
will occur.
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Characteristic of all the fault trees presented here is that before an incident (fire/explosion)
can occur, a procedural or functional failure (i. e. , Vibration, misalignment, contamination,
etc.) must produce an ignition of pyrotechnic material by excessive heat generation (friction,
impact and electrostatic).
The following paragraphs are intended only to relay significant observations by operating
sequence and not to correlate the observations to the building or material being processed.
B. 2. 1 PRESSING OPERATION
The pressing operation's dependency on the automatic sequences of pallet positioning, pressing,
and extracting presents the major hazard potential in this area. The hazards associated with
the pressing operations and the .application of forces of magnitudes between and 20 and 100 tons
should be examined further. Lesser press weights were evidenced on other component
operations, but the hazards were not appreciably redu.ced as evidenced by the Edgewood Safety
Reports.
Observations of the pressing sequence and the occurrence of a press malfunction during the
plant survey indicate many areas for future hazard evaluation and testing activities. These
include but are not limited to:
• Friction
• Impact
• Pinching (Local Pressure)
• Electrostatics
B. 2. 2 BLENDING AND MIXING
Foreign objects represent contaminants which can be a source of ignition for impact/friction
type accidents. For example, lack of lock washers or safety wires on the nuts and bolts
over the mixing bowl while the mixer is operating presents a potentially hazardous situation.
The nuts may work themselves loose, falling in the blending and mixing area, the impact
igniting the mix. The possibility exists for friction and the impact between mixer paddles
and some of these contaminants. The accumulation of raw materials and blended materials
on various pieces of equipment such as mixing paddles was also observed as a potential hazard.
Another potentially hazardous condition exists in the process of reblending of mixes which do
not meet the specification burn time requirements. The reblending by addition of various
amounts of materials to adjust the burn time constitutes a potential hazard through additional
exposure to operating stimuli and contaminants.
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B. 2.3 REAMING
Reaming is accomplished after the operations of fill and press. second fill and press. and.
in some cases, an overfill and press. At this station. each canister. grenade. or other end
item is reamed to remove excess mix. This process assures consistent dimensions in the
end item.
Observations of two separate reaming operations revealed a relatively hazardous condition.
A manual operation exhibited what appeared to be approximately a one-out-of-five reject rate
because of reamer jamming and misalignment. These occurrences resulted in container
damage evidenced by dented surfaces. split-fractures and overreaming.
The rate and nature of these malfunctions suggest further investigation in the areas of friction.
impact. and electrostatics.
B. 2.4 FILLING OPERATION
The manual operation of measuring the proper quantity into the prepared palletized container
constitutes no great hazard; however. the associated spillage of material caused by rapid
motions and proximity of the pressing operation does increase the electrostatics and dust
hazard to a level which should be examined in detail.
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APPENDIX C
NORMAL STARTER MI X TEST RESULTS
C.1 STARTER MIX II, DRAWING NUMBER B-143-7-5
C.l.1 CHEMICAL COMPOSITION
Starter Mix II had the following chemical composition:
• Potassium nitrate 35.0 percent by weight
• Charcoal 4.0 percent by weight
• Corn starch 26.0 percent by weight
• Iron oxide black 22.0 percent by weight
• Aluminum, II, C, 4 13. 0 percent by weight
C.l. 2 TEST RES ULTS
Starter Mix II was tested in accordance with TB 700-2, Chapter 3, "Minimum Test Criteria for
Bulk Explosive Compositions and Solid Propellant Compositions, " with the following results:
• Detonation test - no explosion, burning, or fragmentation
• Ignition and unconfined burning test
• Single cube test - no explosion, average burning time 10 seconds
• Multiple cube test - no explosion, burn time 12.6 seconds
• Thermal stability test - no explosion, ignition, or change in configuration
• Impact sensitivity test
• 3 3/4-inch drop test - no reaction, 10 trials
• lO-inch drop test - no reaction, 10 trials
• Card gap test - no detonation
C.1.3 CLASSIFICATION
Test results, per TB 700-2, paragraph 3-13, indicate a probable military Class 2 rating for
Starter Mix II, Drawing Number B-143-7-5.
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C.2 STARTER MIX III, DRAWING NUMBER B-143-7-6
C.2.1 CHEMICAL COMPOSITION
Starter Mix III had the following chemical composition:
•
•
Potassium nitrate
Charcoal
70.5 percent by weight
29.5 percent by weight
C.2.2 TEST RESULTS
Starter Mix III was tested in accordance with TB 700-2, Chapter 3, "Minimum Test Criteria
for Bulk Explosive Compositions and Solid Propellant Compositions, " with the following results:
• Detonation test - no explosion, burning, or fragmentation
• Ignition and unconfined burning test
• Single cube test - no explosion, average burning time 22.6 seconds
• Multiple cube test - no explosion, burn time 38.6 seconds
• Thermal stability test - no explosion, ignition, or change in configuration
• Impact sensitivity test
• 3 3/4-inch drop test - no reaction, 10 trials
• 10-inch drop test - no reaction, 10 trials
• Card gap test - no detonation
C. 2.3 CLASSIFIC ATION
Test results, per TB 700-2, paragraph 3-13, indicate a probable military Class 2 rating for
Starter Mix III, Drawing Number B-143-7-6.
C.3 STARTER MIX V, DRAWING NUMBER B-143-7-9
C. 3.1 CHEMICAL COMPOSITION
Starter Mix V had the following chemical composition:
•
•
•
•
Potassium nitrate
Charcoal
Corn starch
Nitrocellulose/acetone 4/96
54.0 percent by weight
6. 0 percent by weight
40.0 percent by weight
30/70 percent by weight
C-2
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C. 3. 2 TEST RESULTS
Starter Mix V was tested in accordance with TB 700-2, Chapter 3, "Minimum Test Criteria for
Explosive Compositions and Solid Propellant Compositions, "with the following results:
• Detonation test - no explosion, burning, or fragmentation
• Ignition and unconfined burning test
• Single cube test - deflagration, average burning time 3.45 seconds
• Multiple cube test - no explosion, burn time 4.8 seconds
• Thermal stability test - no explosion, ignition, or change in configuration; sample
lost 19.5 grams weight
• Impact sensitivity test
• 3 3/4-inch drop test - no reaction, 10 trials
• 10-inch drop test - no reaction, 10 trials
• Card gap test - no detonation
C.3.3 CLASSIFICATION
Test results, per TB 700-2, paragraph 3-13, indicate a probable military Class 2 rating for
Starter Mix V, Drawing Number B-143-7-9.
C.4 STARTER MIX VI, DRAWING NUMBER B-143-7-3
C.4.1 CHEMICAL COMPOSITION
Starter Mix VI had the following chemical composition:
• Potassium chlorate 43. 2 percent by weight
• Sulfur 16. 8 percent by weight
• Sodium bicarbonate 30.0 percent by weight
• Corn starch 10, 0 percent by weight
• Nitrocellulose/acetone 4/96 40/60 percent by weight
C.4.2 TEST RESULTS
Starter Mix VI was tested in accordance with TB 700-2, Chapter 3, "Minimum Test Criteria
for Bulk Explosive Compositions and Solid Propellant Compositions, "with the follOWing results:
• Detonation test - no explosion, burning, or fragmentation
• Ignition and unconfined burning test
• Single cube test - no explosion, average burning time 17 seconds
C-3
R-064
• Multiple cube test - no explosion. burn time 20.1 seconds
• Thermal stability test - no explosion. ignition. or change in configuration
• Impact sensitivity test
• 3 3/4-inch drop test - explosion. 6 trials; no reaction. 4 trials
• lO-inch drop test - explosion. 9 trials; no reaction. 1 trial
• Card gap test - no detonation
C. 4. 3 CLASSIFICATION
Test results, per TB 700-2. paragraph 3-13. indicate a probable military Class 7 rating for
Starter Mix VI. Drawing Number B-143-7-3.
C.5 STARTER MIX XII, DRAWING NUMBER B-143-7-1
C.5.1 CHEMICAL COMPOSITION
Starter Mix XII had the follOWing chemical composition":
• Potassium nitrate
• Charcoal
• Nitrocellulose/acetone 4/96
C. 5. 2 TEST RESULTS
70.5 percent by weight
29.5 percent by weight
50/50 percent by weight
Starter Mix XII was tested in accordance with TB 700-2. Chapter 3. "Minimum Test Criteria
for Bulk Explosive Compositions and Solid Propellant Compositions. " with the following results:
• Detonation test - no explosion. burning. or fragmentation
• Ignition and unconfined burning test
• Single cube test - defLagration (some particles left pan and were scattered
unburned). average burning time 0.8 seconds
• Multiple cube test - deflagration (same as single cube test). burn time 1. 6 seconds
• Thermal stability test - no explosion, ignition. or change in configuration
• Impact sensitivity test
• 3 3/4-inch drop test - no reaction. 10 trials
• lO-inch drop test - explosion. 2 trials; decomposition. 5 trials; no reaction. 3 trials
• Card gap test - no detonation
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C. 5. 3 CLASSIFICATION
Test results, per TB 700-2, paragraph 3-13, indicate a probable military Class 7 rating for
Starter Mix XII, Drawing Number B-143-7-1 •
.
C.6 STARTER MIX XXV. DRAWING NUMBER B-143-7-4
C. 6. 1 CHEMICAL COMPOSITION
Starter Mix XXV had the following chemical composition:
• Potassium nitrate 35. 0 percent by weight
• Charcoal 4.0 percent by weight
• Silicone 26. 0 percent by weight
• Iron oxide black 22.0 percent by weight
• Aluminum, II, C, 4 13.0 percent by weight
• Nitrocellulose/acetone 4/96 16.7/83.3 percent by weight
C.6.2 TEST RESULTS
Starter Mix XXV was tested in accordance with TB 700-2, Chapter 3, "Minimum Test Criteria
for Bulk Explosive Compositions and Solid Propellant Compositions, "with the following results:
• Detonation test - no explosion, burning, or fragmentation
• Ignition and unconfined burning test
• Single cube test - no explosion, average burning time 5.0 seconds
• Multiple cube test - no explosion, burn time 5.8 seconds
• Thermal stability test - no explosion, ignition, or change in configuration
• Impact sensitivity test
• 3 3/4-inch drop test - no reaction, 10 trials
• lO-inch drop test - no reaction, 10 trials
• Card gap test - no detonation
C. 6. 3 CLASSIFICATION
Test results, per TB 700-2, paragraph 3-13, indicate a probable military Class 2 rating for
Starter Mix XXV, Drawing Number B-143-7-4.
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C.7 FIRST FIRE VII. DRAWING NUMBER B-143-9-1
C. 7.1 CHEMICAL COMPOSITION
First Fire VII had the following chemical composition:
• Silicone 25.0 percent by weight
• Titanium 25.0 percent by weight
• Iron oxide red 25.0 percent by weight
• Red lead 25.0 percent by weight
• Nitrocellulose/acetone 4.50/36.75 9/32 percent by weight
C.7.2 TEST RESULTS
First Aire VIT was tested in accordance with TB 700-2, Chapter 3, ''Minimum Test Criteria
for Bulk Explosive Compositions and Solid Propellant Compositions, " with the following results:
• Detonation test - no explosion, burning, or fragmentation
• Ignition and unconfined burning test
• Single cube test - no explosion, average burning time 5.75 seconds
• Multiple cube test - no explosion, burn time 7.0 seconds
• Thermal stability test - no explosion, ignition, or change in configuration
• Impact sensitivity test
• 3 3/4-inch drop test - no reaction, 10 trials
• 10-inch drop test - no reaction, 10 trials
• Card gap test - no detonation
C.7.3 CLASSIFICATION
Test results, per TB 700-2, piragraph 3-13, indicate a probable military Class 2 rating for
First Fire VIT, Drawing Number B-143-9-1.
C-6
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APPENDIX D
MIXER SIMULATION TESTS AND RESULTS
0.1 RATIONALE
As discussed in the Systems Safety Analysis of the Phase il, Segment 3 report (GE-MTSO-R-
054). the mixing operation involving the 175-quart, 125-pound batch vertical planetary mixers
currently being used to prepare colored smoke formulations has been identified as a primary hazard
area (Figure 0-1). The safety analysis further pointed out that failure modes such as misalign-
ment, impact, or inadequate grounding of the mixer blades and/or mixer bowl are likely to
cause ignition by frictional of electrical spark within the bulk of the pyrotechnic materials.
Wh~n ignition is induced below the surface. the material above supplies a significant pressure
head which allows a transient pressure buildup caused by the temporary confinement of reaction
by-products.
Previous testing, as reported in the Phase I final report (GE-MTSD-R-035), demonstrated that
the pressure-time curve of a confined pyrotechnic closely resembles that of a detonating explo-
sive. Thus, a potentially hazardous situation exists during the mixing operation because of the
possibility of simultaneous ignition and confinement in a localized region near the bottom of the
125-quart mixing bowl.
Self confinement simulation tests of large bulk pyrotechnics were designed to provide data to
evaluate a potentially hazardous situation. In lipe with the concept of "worst case" testing, the
location and type of ignition source in all cases were chosen to maximize the likelihood
of inducing a detonation (according to guidelines established by previous experimental results)
while maintaining a credible simulation of an actual mixing operation involVing the 175-quart
mixing bowls containing 125-pounds of pyrotechnic smoke composition.
D.2 TECHNICAL APPROACH
0.2.1 OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this test program were to determine the following criteria:
• Bulk mix and mixing bowl influence on the reaction rate.
• Extent of the pressure buildup.
• Probability of communication to loose powder inadvertently scattered in the vicinity of the
mixing operation.
• SCaling laws to predict the outcome of an actual incident involVing the 175-quart mixers.
To accomplish these objectives, two self-confinement simulation test series were performed.
The vessels used to contain the pyrotechnic material were:
D-1
Figure D-l. Typical Mixing Operation
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• 6-inch stainless steel pipe.
• 80-quart stainless steel mixing bowl.
D.2.2 MIXER EQUIPMENT SCALING
Testing was based on simulating' fully loaded, 175-quart capacity stainless steel mixing bowls
containing 125-pounds of pyrotechnic smoke composition (Figure D-2). The height of the compo-
sition when 125-pounds were placed into the 175-quart bowl was 16 inches. The bowl was 26
inches in diameter and 24 inches high. The bowl was made of grade 304 stainless steel, 12 gage
thickness.
D.2.3 SELF CONFINEMENT SIMULATION USING 6-INCH STAINLESS STEEL PIPE
Pyrotechnic mixes can simultaneously be ignited and confined in a localized region near the bot-
tom of the mixer bowl. The mix and vessel influence on the reaction rate is through boundary
effects, thereby enabling a transitory high pressure buildup.
It is assumed that ignition takes place at the bottom of the mixing bowl in an arbitrarily small loc-
alized region representing 10 percent of the total bowl area. Therefore, approximately 12.5
pounds of a 125-pound batch (representing a solid oylinder 16 inches high and 7 inches in a dia-
meter) effectively confines the ignition area through boundary effects and enables pressure build-
up.
As closely as possible to the dimensions given in the preceding paragraph, a six-inch diameter,
12-gage stainless steel pipe (with a cover platE;! of the same type of material welded across the
bottom) was filled with sulfur yellow smoke composition to a height of 16 inches (See Figures
D-3 and D-4). Two types of igniters, hot wire and engineer's special blasting cap, were placed
in the bottom of the vessel. To determine the effects of a void on reaction rate, a paper cone
was placed over the J-2 blasting cap during one test.
Two pounds of granular sulfur yellow composition were placed within three feet of the vessels
to determine the probability of communication to composition inadvertently scattered in the vicin-
ity of the mixer (See Figure D-5).
Additionally, the two-pound tray was covered in several tests to determine if this would affect
the probability of communication.
D.2.3.2 Instrumentation
The instrumentation package consisted of the following (Figure D-6):
• Blast overpressure package - 2 locations
• 24 fps documentation - Mitchell cameras
• Thermocouples - 3 locations
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MATERIALS:
R-064
o
~10"~
~...-----18"------i~
® 304 sis, .1094" + .02" - PIPE CD HOT WIRE OR J-2 WITH INSULATED LEADS
® PINE - 2" x 4" ® 7" PAPER CONE
© PLATE, 304 SIS, .125" THK. ® 12-1/2 LBS. OF SMOKE MIX
TEST VESSEL-MIXING OPERATION
Figure D-4. Six-Inch Test Vessel for Mixing Simulation
D-6

TEST PAD
CD
~
BUNKER
CD MITCHELL CAMERA, 24 fps
® TRANSDUCER
@ TEST VESSEL
G) 2 LBS. OF SMOKE MIX WITH METAL TRAY
® PROTECTIVE COVER, METAL
® 2" x 4" PINE
(i) THERMOCOUPLE, 2 EA.
R-064
/
Figure D-6. Instrumentation Setup for Six-Inch Pipe Tests
D-8
R-064
D.2.4 SELF CONFINEMENT SIMULATION USING 80-QUART STAINLESS STEEL MIXING
BOWL - QUASI FULL SCALE
D.2.4.1 setup
An 80-quart stainless steel mixing bowl containing 46 pounds of smoke composition was used to
determine runup and sympathetic potential of an accident involving a 175-quart vertical mixer
(Figure D-7). By using a large scale mixing bowl, the actual severity of reaction can be deter-
mined for this particular type of vessel and pyrotechnic composition.
A two-pound loose pile of sulfur yellow smoke powder was placed three feet from the mixing bowl
in order to simulate mix inadvertently scattered in the vicinity of the mixer. Additionally, the
two-pound trays were covered in. several tests to determine if this would effect the probability
of communication. A J-2 blasting cap for ignition placed in the bottom of the vessel. This test
was repeated to verify the initial data acquired.
D. 2 .4.2 Instrumentation
The instrumentation package consisted of the following (Figure D-8):
• Blast overpressure package
• 24 fps documentati~n - Mitchell Cameras
• Thermocouples - three locations
D.3 TEST RESULTS
D.3.1 TEST 1
D.3.1.1 setup
For test 1, twelve pounds of sulfur green were placed in a six-inch ill, stainless steel pipe. An
S-94 squib, placed in the bottom of the pipe, was used for ignition.
D.3.1.2 Chronology of Events
Test 1 occurred as follows:
a. Ignition
b. Blow-out of material, fire and smoke in a two-foot diameter
circle around the test vessel containing the burning composition
c. Maximum reaction and communication to mix in adjacent tray on
ground.
d. Flame extinguished and intense dark smoke.
TIME
o seconds
10 seconds
35 seconds
60 seconds
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e. Recurrence of flame inside the vessel.
. f. Dark .smoke
g. End of test
D. 3.1. 3 Observations
All of the sulfur green composition was consumed (Figure D-9).
D. 3.1. 4 Meteorological Conditions
Meteorological conditions during test 1 were:
• Wind Direction - 1300
• Wind Velocity - 8 knots
R-064
TIME
120 seconds
180 seconds
8 minutes
•
•
•
D.3.2.1
oTemperature - 48 F
Humidity - 23%
Pressure - 30.40 nun Hg
TEST 2
For test 2, twelve pounds of sulfur violet were placed inside a ID stainless steel pipe, and a hot
wire was used as the ignition source.
D. 3.2.2 Chronology of Events
Test 2 proceeded as follows:
a. Ignition
b. Blow-out of material, fire and smoke in a two-foot diameter
circle around the test vessel containing the burning smoke
composition.
c. Maximum reaction and communication to mix in adjacent
tray on ground.
d. Flame extinguished and intense dark smoke.
e. Smoldering
f. End of test
TIME
o seconds
5 seconds
16-20 seconds
45 seconds
90 seconds
8 minutes
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D.. 3.2.3 Observations
All of the sulfur violet composition was consumed.
D. 3.2.4 Meteorological Conditions
Meteorological conditions for test 2 were:
• Wind Direction - NE/50o
•
•
•
•
D.3.3
D.3.3.1
Wind Velocity - 4-5 knots
oTemperature - 40 F
Humidity - 28-30%
Pressure - 30.47 mm Hg
TEST 3
For test 3, 46 pounds of sulfur violet were placed in an 80-quart mixing bowl. A J-2 blasting
cap was used as the ignition source.
D. 3. 3. 2 Chronology of Events
Test 3 events were as follows:
TIME
a. Ignition 0 seconds
b. Blow-out of material, fire and smoke in a two-foot diameter circle
around the vessel containing the burning smoke composition,
characteristized by the entire area being enveloped in flames. 5 seconds
c. Maximum reaction and communication to mix in adjacent tray
on ground. 25 seconds
d. Dark smoke 70 seconds
e. End of test 8 minutes
D.3.3.3 Observations (Figures D-10 and D-ll)
The sample material was:
• Completely burned
• Still smoldering 25 minutes after ignition
• Spewed approximately 25 feet down wind. Raw material was also scattered.
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D. 3.3.4 Meteorological Conditions
Meteorological conditions for test 3 were:
•
•
•
•
•
D.3.4
D.3.4.1
Wind Direction - SE
Wind Velocity - 5-7 mph
oTemperature - 50 F
Humidity - 40%
Pressure - 29.38 mm Hg
TEST 4
For test 4, twelve pounds of sulfur violet were placed in a six-inch steel pipe. A J-2 blasting
cap with a paper cone placed over it was used as a biased ignition source.
D. 3. 4. 2 Chronology of Events
Test 4 proceeded as follows:
a. Ignition
b. Blow-out of material, fire and smoke in a two-foot diameter
circle around the test vessel containing the burned smoke mix.
c. Maximum reaction and communication to mix in adjacent tray
on ground.
d. Flame extinguished and intense dark smoke appeared
f. Smoldering
g. End of test
D. 3. 4.3 Observations
During test 4, it was observed that:
TIME
0-5 seconds
30 seconds
40 seconds
50 seconds
60 seconds
8 minutes
• The twelve-pounds of sulfur violet, located down wind from the pipe, was completely
consumed.
• There was no apparent difference in the reaction of the material when the paper cone
was placed over the J-2 blasting cap.
D. 3. 4.4 Meteorological Conditions
Meteorological conditions for test 4 were:
• Wind Direction - SE
D-17
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• Wind Velocity - 5-7 mph
•
0Temperature - 50 F
• Humidity - 40%
• Pressure - 29.38
0.3.5 TEST 5
n. 3. 5.1 Description
For test 5. twelve pounds of sulfur violet were placed in the bottom of a six-inch steel pipe.
A J-2 blasting cap was used as the ignition source.
D. 3. 5. 2 Chronology of Events
Test 5 proceeded as follows:
TIME
a. Ignition 0 seconds
b. Blow-out of material, fire and smoke in a two-foot diameter circle
aroWld test vessel containing burned smoke mix 5 seconds
c. Maximum reaction and communication to mix in adjacent tray on
groWld. 11 seconds
d. Flame extinguished and intense dark smoke appeared. 17 seconds
e. Dark smoke 20 seconds
f. Smoldering 50 seconds
g. End of test 8 minutes
0.3.5.3 Observations
The sulfur violet composition was completely burned.
D. 3. 5. 4 Meteorological Conditions
Meteorological conditions during test 5 were:
•
•
•
•
Wind Direction - SE
Wind Velocity - 5 mph
oTemperature - 49 F
Humidity - 38%
D-18
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D. 3.6 TEST 6
D. 3. 6. 1 Description
For test 6, 46 pounds of sulfur violet were placed in an 80-quart mixing bowl with a J-2 blasting
cap used as the ignition source:
D. 3. 6. 2 Chronology of Events
Test 6 proceeded as follows:
a. Ignition
b. Blow-out of material, fire and smoke in a two-foot diameter
circle around the test vessel containing the burning smoke mix.
c. Maximum reaction and communication to m~ in adjacent tray
on ground.
d. Dark smoke
D. 3.6.3 Observations
TIME
o seconds
4 seconds
4-21 seconds
21-41 seconds
Violent deflagration, heavy smoke and spewing occurred during test 6. The reaction was such
that there were alternations between smoke, spewing of material, and flame, too rapid to time
(FiguresD-10 andD-ll). Propagation to pans apparently took place in this time (exact time
was not determined because of the violent reaction). Dense smoke existed for the period from
21 to 41 seconds.
D. 3. 6.4 Meteorological Conditions
Meteorological conditions during test 6 were:
•
•
•
Wind Direction - SE
Wind Velocity - Calm
oTemperature - 48 F
D.3.7
• Humidity - 40%
SUMMARY OF CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
The data for each of the six tests is summarized in Table D-1.
P. 3. 8 SUMMARY OF TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS
The data for each of the six tests is summarized in Table 0-2.
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D.4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
D.4.1 CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results of the six tests, the following has been concluded:
• The mixing operation presents a fire hazard in view of the extensive dispersal of
fire brands accompanying ignition. In all six tests, at least a fifteen foot mushroom
was generated immediately after ignition. This resulted from a blow-out of combus-
tion gases through the mix formulation.
• Even though every attempt was made to protect the passive sensors (which were placed
in the vicinity of the bowl in order to measure probability of communication to loose
powder incidententlyscattered during mixing operation) from the fire brand shower
by using protective covers, the passive sensors were ignited eventually by the intense
fire brand shower. As shown in Figure D-1-2 andD-13, the areas of coverage with
burning fire brands are as follows:
Amount of PyrO (lbs)
12 pounds
46 pounds
125 pounds
8 sq. ft.
64 sq. ft.
240 sq. ft. (extrapolated)
In order to obtain a reasonable estimate of the area affected by a full 125 pound batch,
the available data is fitted to the function
B(Area) = (Mass)
As shown in Figure D-14, this equation will pass through the origin (i. e., zero area
affected if no mass is expended) with the parametric solutions A = 0.17 and B = 1. 55.
Thus the extrapolated area affected by 125 pounds of pyrotechnics is calculated to be
approximately 240 square feet. The radius of a 240 square foot circle is approxi-
mately 9 feet, which established a minimum safe distance (assuming no wind) in which
sympathetic ignition of pyroteclmic material would fail to occur.
• Amplitude of dynamic overpressure was below minimum level required to trigger
transient recorders. Additionally, there was no evidence of flexure pressure in the
walls of any of the vessels either from dynamic overpressure or thermal expansion.
NOTE
The bottom of both the six-inch and 80-quart bowl were
deliberately unsupported so as to simplify the calculation
of the rupture strength/pressure.
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• A greater degree of blow-out of unburned mix for the twelve-pound tests using blasting
cap igniters was evidenced as compared to the hot wire or S-94 tests. Consequently,
the duration of events (Table 0-1) for the blasting cap tests are much shorter than
hot wire or S-94 test~g.
• As a result of placing the paper cone over the blasting cap in the twelve-pound test
less material was blown-out; consequently, the duration of events (Table 0-1) for the
paper cone blasting cap test was greater than similar tests without the paper cone.
• Comparing the temperature/time plot (FigureD-15) for a J-2 blasting cap and hot
wire igniter placed individually in twelve pounds of sulfur violet shows the tempera-
ture rise and maximum temperature developed by the J-2 cap configuration to be
greater than the hot wire configuration by 18 percent.
• Comparing the temperature/time plot (Figur:eD-16) for the 46-pounds and 12 pounds
of sulfur violet tests both configurations being ignited by a J-2 blasting cap shows
the temperature of the twelve-pound configuration increasing sooner than the 46 -
pound configuration. In view of the fact that the thermocouple for the twelve-pound
test is closer to the igniter source than for the 46-pound test, a longer time is
required for the respective thermocouple to register any temperature increase.
Additionally, the temperature rate rise and maximum temperature developed by the
46-pound tests are greater than the twelve-pound configuration by 9.7 percent.
0.4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that good housekeeping be emphasized on all mixing and filling operations.
Mixing beater speeds should be carefully maintained to prevent spillage in the immediate vicinity
of the mixing operation.
It is recommended that whenever the compositions tested (sulfur violet and sulfur:.greep) are
stored in quantity under the minimal "safe distance" (9 foot), precautionary measures such as
protective covers be employed to reduce to a minimum the probability of communication.
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--1- J-2
o 12 Ibs of Sulfur Violet with
hot wire igniter
X 12 lbs of Sulfur Violet with
J-2 blasting cap
~
o
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Figure D-15. Temperature/Time Plot for J-2 Blasting Caps and Hot Wire
Ignition Tests Individually Placed in 12 lbs of Sulfur Violet
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APPENDIX E
RELATED MATERIAL PROPERTIES
E. 1 INTRODUCTION
In order to develop a program which has general application to a variety of processes, determi-
nation of basic critical parameters, as defined below, are required. These parameters are
functionally related to:
• The mechanical and electrical threshold energy for initiation, communication,
transition.
• Energy release characteristics to assess the margin of safety of the manufacturing
operation.
E.2 TNT EQUIVALENCY
Mathematical techniques are applied to obtain a relationship between blast overpressure of pyro-
technic materials tested and that of TNT.
E.3 DIFFERENTIAL THERMAL ANALYSIS
Differential thermal analysis (DTA) measurements of a material are used extensively to deter-
mine heat content and to detect any exothermic or endothermic changes. Changes which may
occur are as follows:
• Decomposition
• Dehydration
• Crystalline Transition
• Melting
• Boiling
• Vaporization
• Polymerization
• Oxidation
• Reduction
• Specific Heat
The functional operation of DTA relies on comparison measurements. The temperature difference
between a sample and a chemically inert reference material is compared while both are heated
at the same rate. Applying the Imown heat content of the reference material to the relative tem-
perature measurements provides a complete thermal history.
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E.4 HEAT LIBERATION
A Parr bomb calorimeter is used to determine the thermal energy liberated during combustion
of a unit mass of material. The material and its reaction are completely confined inside a ves-
sel (Parr bomb) of known heat capacity. Determination of its average temperature rise or the
average temperature rise of the vessel in a bath of known heat content will establish the heat
liberated during reaction.
E. 5 SPECIFIC PRESSURE FROM COMBUSTION
The pressure generated as a result of the reaction of a unit mass of material confined to a unit
volume can be determined by including a pressure transducer in a high strength confining vessel
of known volume; e. g., a Parr bomb vessel.
E.6 SPECIFIC GAS LIBERATED VOLUME
The gas liberated during a confined chemical reaction determines the pressure buildup. If the
pressure generated is greater than the yield strength of the confining rredium (i. e. , die, hopper,
canister, self-confinement, etc.), a blast pressure release is likely to result. The vol ume
liberated at standard temperature and pressure can be determined by accurate chemical formu-
lation (ratio of fuel oxidizer) and weighing. Alternatively, the volume liberated can be inferred
from the pressure determination (paragraph E. 5), assuming an ideal gas and determination of
the gas temperature.
E.7 THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY
Thermal conductivity is defined as the time rate of transfer of heat by conduction across the
unit sample area when subjected to a unit temperature gradient.
E.8 SPECIFIC HEAT
The specific heat capacity of a material is the heat absorbed in a unit mass to cause a tempera-
ture rise of one degree.
E.9 BULK MODULUS
The modulus, 13, of volume elasticity can be expressed as
fJ = dP V
dV
where dP is a change in pressure on the material and d~ is the resulting fractional change in
volume. The bulk modulus specifies the amount of pressure required to compress a material
a given amount.
E.I0 ELECTRICAL CONDUCTIVITY
Electrical conductivity is determined by the current which flows through a unit area when sub-
jected to a unit potential gradient.
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E.11 DIELECTRIC CONSTANT
The dielectric constant of a medium is defined by E in the equation
F=~·
f r 2
where F is the force of attraction between two charges Q and Q' separated by a distance rand
in a uniform medium.
E.12 DIELECTRIC STRENGTH
Dielectric strength is the minimum electric field to which the dielectric material must be sub-
jected before a disruptive discharge occurs through the sample.
E.13 TRIBOELECTRICITY
Th'e triboelectric effect refers to charge transfer between dissimilar surfaces upon rubbing
together. Triboelectric effects provide a mechanism for spatial charge separation. An electro-
meter can be employed to measure the electric fields c:lue to charge separation. If the electric
field between the separated charge becomes larger than the dielectric strength of the material
between the charge, a spark may occur. reducing the electric field. This spark is a potential
ignition source (see electrostatic ignition energy, paragraph E. 14).
E.14 ELECTROSTATIC IGNITION ENERGY
The electrostatic ignition energy of pyrotechnic dusts/powders is the minimum energy in a
spark discharge which will ignite the material. Experimentally. the electrostatic energy is
stored in a capacitor at a voltage sufficient to exceed the sample's dielectric strength. The
energy stored in a capacitor charged to a voltage, V, is
where C is the capacitance. When discharged through a spark gap, most of this energy is
transferred to the material within the gap. Thus, it is conventional to parameterize the
spark by the energy stored in the capacitor.
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